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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
During Talena Hampton’s trial, two of the prosecutor’s witnesses told the jury
Ms. Hampton had posted bond in two counties, had outstanding warrants in four counties, and
had a history of purchasing methamphetamine. Although this evidence was irrelevant and
prejudicial, the district court denied Ms. Hampton’s motion for a mistrial. Moreover, the district
court allowed the evidence of Ms. Hampton’s bonds for “identification,” even though (1) the
witness’s identification of Ms. Hampton in the courtroom was not in dispute, (2) her presence at
the scene of the crime was not in dispute, and (3) the witness was reciting a third party’s
knowledge of Ms. Hampton’s bonds, not his own. The district court thus abused its discretion by
admitting this evidence. In addition, the district court committed reversible error by denying
Ms. Hampton’s motion for a mistrial.
Ms. Hampton also maintains the State presented insufficient evidence for one of the
charged offenses because, as an alleged aider and abettor, the State had to prove more than her
mere knowledge of or acquiescence in the crime. The State did not meet its burden.
Due to these errors, Ms. Hampton respectfully requests this Court vacate her judgment of
conviction and remand her case for a judgment of acquittal on one charge and a new trial for the
others.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Ms. Hampton with aiding and abetting grand theft, aiding and abetting
aggravated assault (with a deadly weapon enhancement), and conspiracy to commit grand theft.
(R., pp.47–49.) The co-conspirators were Alexandria Arellano (Ms. Hampton’s girlfriend) and
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Ivan Herrera. (R., p.49.) Ms. Hampton pled not guilty and exercised her right to a jury trial.
(R., p.54.)
In its case in chief, the State called four witnesses. The alleged victim, Shayne White,
testified Ms. Hampton and Ms. Arellano temporarily lived with him in his RV. (See Tr. Vol. I,1
p.132, L.11–p.133, L.25.) During this time, Mr. White wanted to get his girlfriend out of Ada
County Jail, but he could not afford to post bond. (Tr. Vol. I, p.134, L.3–p.135, L.17.) Mr. White
testified Ms. Hampton told him that she had a friend who was related to a bail bondsman.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.136, Ls.19–25.) Ms. Hampton explained to Mr. White that the bail bondsman could
do her a favor to bail out Mr. White’s girlfriend. (Tr. Vol. I, p.136, Ls.22–25.) The name of the
company was Sonia’s Bail Bonds. (Tr. Vol. I, p.137, Ls.5–7.)
Later that day, Ms. Hampton, Ms. Arellano, and Mr. White drove to meet the bail
bondsman at a Treatment and Recovery Clinic (“TARC Center”). (See Tr. Vol. I, p.139, L.16–
p.142, L.8). Mr. White met the bondsman, Mr. Herrera, in the parking lot and gave him four
$500.00 Walmart gift cards and $200.00 in cash. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.142, L.15–p.147, L.4.)
Mr. White testified Mr. Herrera told him to fill out some paperwork, so Mr. White followed him
down an alley. (Tr. Vol. I, p.147, Ls.5–9.) Ms. Hampton and Ms. Arellano followed behind
Mr. White. (Tr. Vol. I, p.148, Ls.18–23, p.149, L.15.) Once in the alley, Mr. White testified
Mr. Herrera drew a gun on him and said, “Get the fuck out of here.” (See Tr. Vol. I, p.147, L.10–
p.148, L.17.) Mr. White, Ms. Arellano, and Ms. Hampton quickly turned around to leave.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.149, Ls.15–18, p.149, L.25–150, L.2.) Mr. White testified Ms. Arellano looked
shocked and scared. (Tr. Vol. I, p.167, L.15–p.168, L.25.) Mr. White, Ms. Hampton, and
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There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains day one of the jury
trial. The second, cited as Volume II, contains day two of the jury trial. The third, cited as
Volume III, contains the sentencing hearing.
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Ms. Arellano immediately left and returned to Mr. White’s house. (Tr. Vol. I, p.150, Ls.5–12.)
There was no evidence Ms. Arellano or Ms. Hampton threatened Mr. White in any way. In fact,
Mr. White denied ever being in fear of Ms. Arellano or Ms. Hampton throughout the incident.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.166, Ls.22–23.) Later, Mr. White “got an inkling” they were “in on it” and reported
the incident to the police. (Tr. Vol. I, p.151, Ls.7–9, p.152, Ls.4–5.) Mr. White also told Viking
Bail Bonds about what happened and identified Mr. Herrera to them. (Tr. Vol. I, p.153, L.18–
p.155, L.17.)
Next, the State called Shawn Crumbley with Viking Bail Bonds. (Tr. Vol. I, p.180,
Ls.10–13, p.181, Ls.4–9.) Mr. Crumbley testified Mr. White asked him to find Ms. Hampton.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.186, Ls.17–25.) Mr. Crumbley then explained how he found Mr. Herrera and,
eventually, Ms. Hampton. (Tr. Vol. I, p.187, L.19–p.192, L.23.) Twice during Mr. Crumbley’s
testimony, he told the jury about outstanding bonds and warrants for Ms. Hampton’s arrest.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.185, Ls.17–23, p.192, Ls.12–16.) Ms. Hampton objected and later moved for a
mistrial. (Tr. Vol. I, p.185, Ls.24–25, p.193, L.24–p.194, L.21.) On cross-examination,
Mr. Crumbley testified Ms. Hampton told him that she did not know Mr. Herrera had a gun on
him until she saw him pull it on Mr. White. (Tr. Vol. I, p.220, Ls.8–11.)
The State also called two police officers: Officer Rivers and Officer Paredez. (See
generally Tr. Vol. I, p.221, L.15–p.252, L.2.) Officer Rivers interviewed Ms. Hampton after the
alleged crime. (Tr. Vol. I, p.223, L.14–p.233, L.21.) While testifying to Ms. Hampton’s
statements, Officer Rivers told the jury about Ms. Hampton’s purchase of methamphetamine.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.228, Ls.23–24.) Ms. Hampton objected and added it to her mistrial motion.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.229, Ls.2–4.) Officer Rivers also testified, when Ms. Hampton, Ms. Arellano, and
Mr. Herrera were allegedly conspiring on their bail bonds scheme, Mr. Herrera said, “Well, I’ll
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do it. I’m a shooter. I’ll take the money.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.229, Ls.19–20.) Ms. Hampton also told
Officer Rivers she saw Mr. Herrera’s gun before the incident and said, “You don’t need that.
You don’t need to use it. Don’t bring it, kind of comment.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.231, L.19–p.232, L.7.)
Officer Paredez testified he searched Mr. Herrera’s trash and found Ms. Hampton’s debit card
and a Walmart gift card. (See generally Tr. Vol. I, p.237, L.14–p.244, L.1.) Officer Paredez also
interviewed Ms. Hampton. (Tr. Vol. I, p.244, L.2–p.250, L.4.) Similar to Officer Rivers’s
testimony, Officer Paredez testified Ms. Hampton told him that she told Mr. Herrera the gun
“wasn’t necessary” and he did not need it. (Tr. Vol. I, p.246, Ls.6–11.) The State rested. (Tr. Vol.
I, p.252, Ls.6–7.)
Ms. Hampton moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
(“I.C.R.”) 29 on the charge of aiding and abetting aggravated assault. (Tr. Vol. I, p.253, L.22–
p.254, L.25.) She argued the State presented no evidence beyond Ms. Hampton’s mere
acquiescence in Mr. Herrera’s assault of Mr. White with the gun. (Tr. Vol. I, p.254, Ls.1–25.)
The district court “anticipate[d] a motion” on this count, but denied it nonetheless. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.256, L.13–p.258, L.10.)
Ms. Hampton testified in her defense. In light of Officer Rivers’s testimony,
Ms. Hampton admitted she met Mr. White through “exchanging drugs” and, specifically,
methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.283, L.9–p.284, L.4.) Ms. Hampton testified Mr. Herrera told
her that he would help Mr. White as a favor and that one of his relatives worked for Sonia’s Bail
Bonds. (Tr. Vol. II, p.291, L.5–p.292, L.15.) She admitted Mr. Herrera had said, “I’m a shooter.
I’ll do it,” while they were discussing a bond for Mr. White, and she had told him in response,
“Seriously, dude. Like, you’re – I was kind of offensive. I told him that he was a little kid,
immature, like trying to make a name for himself, told him he didn’t need a gun to do that, that
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he was just – he was acting immaturely. (Tr. Vol. II, p.316, Ls.6–21.) That was when she told
him that he did not need a gun. (Tr. Vol. II, p.316, L.25–p.317, L.1.) She further testified, during
the alleged crime, Mr. Herrera told Mr. White to come fill out some paperwork and take a drug
test. (Tr. Vol. II, p.299, Ls.6–25.) Mr. Herrera had Mr. White walk around the corner of the
TARC Center and then Mr. Herrera pulled a gun on Mr. White. (Tr. Vol. II, p.300, L.1–p.301,
L.10.) Ms. Hampton did not see the gun, and she was shocked by Mr. Herrera’s actions. (Tr. Vol.
II, p.300, Ls.11–17, p.302, L.13.) During her testimony, Ms. Hampton also admitted to having
misdemeanor warrants. (Tr. Vol. II, p.310, L.9, p.355, L.1.)
The jury found Ms. Hampton guilty as charged. (Tr. Vol. II, p.455, L.7–p.456, L.9.) The
district court sentenced her to ten years, with two and one-half years fixed, for grand theft,
fifteen years, with three years fixed for aggravated assault, and ten years, with two and one-half
years fixed, for conspiracy to commit grand theft. (Tr. Vol. III, p.37, Ls.3–11.) The sentences
would be served concurrently for an aggregate sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.37, Ls.11–12.)
Ms. Hampton timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.142–44, 148–49.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting irrelevant evidence of
Ms. Hampton’s bonds in other counties to prove identity?

II.

Did the district court err by denying Ms. Hampton’s motion for a mistrial after the jury
heard improper testimony on Ms. Hampton’s warrants in other counties and her
methamphetamine purchase?

III.

Did the State prove Ms. Hampton aided and abetted Mr. Herrera in his assault with a gun
when the evidence showed nothing more than her mere knowledge, acquiescence, or
assent in his crime?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Irrelevant Evidence Of Ms. Hampton’s
Bonds In Other Counties
A.

Introduction
Ms. Hampton contends the district court abused its discretion by admitting

Mr. Crumbley’s testimony of his supervisor (“the supervisor”) posting Ada and Elmore County
bonds for Ms. Hampton. The evidence of the supervisor posting bonds for Ms. Hampton in other
counties was not relevant for any purpose. Therefore, the district court did not act consistently
with the applicable legal standards by admitting this evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews questions regarding the admissibility of evidence using a
mixed standard of review. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143 (2008). First,
whether the evidence is relevant is a matter of law that is subject to free review.
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569 (2007). Second, [the Court] review[s] the
district court’s determination of whether the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion. Stevens, 146 Idaho at
143.

State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907 (2015). To determine whether the district court abused its
discretion, the Court considers three factors: (1) whether the court correctly perceived the issue
as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently within the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the court reached its decision
by an exercise of reason.” Id.
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C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards
Because Ms. Hampton’s Bonds In Other Counties Posted By A Third Party Were Not
Relevant To Any Material Fact
Unless the Idaho Rules of Evidence (“I.R.E.”) or court rules provide otherwise, relevant

evidence is admissible, and irrelevant evidence is not. I.R.E. 402. “Evidence is relevant if it has
‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”’ State v.
Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2007) (quoting I.R.E. 401).
Here, Ms. Hampton asserts the evidence of the supervisor’s prior interactions with her in
posting bond in other counties was irrelevant to any issue in the case. Bail bondsman
Mr. Crumbley testified that he knew Ms. Hampton from failing to appear and having “to bring
her back.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.184, L.25–p.185, L.16.) He recognized her in the courtroom and
identified her. (Tr. Vol. I, p.185, Ls.5–16.) There was no objection to his identification. (See
Tr. Vol. I, p.184, L.25–p.185, L.16.) After this uncontested identification, the prosecutor asked
Mr. Crumbley “how many personal interactions” he had with Ms. Hampton before the alleged
offense and tracking her down. (Tr. Vol. I, p.185, Ls.17–19.) Mr. Crumbley answered, “Very
limited, probably two or three interactions.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.185, Ls.20–21.) He continued,
however, to add: “[M]y supervisor . . . also had more interactions with her than I did, posting
bonds for her on behalf in Ada and Elmore Counties.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.185, Ls.20–24.)
Ms. Hampton immediately objected to the “relevancy of these other counties.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.185,
Ls.24–25.) The district court asked whether this evidence went “to identification,” the prosecutor
responded, “Yeah,” and the district court overruled the objection. (Tr. Vol. I, p.186, Ls.1–4.)
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1.

Ms. Hampton’s bonds in other counties, posted by a third party, were not relevant
for the witness’s identification

The interactions of Mr. Crumbley’s supervisor with Ms. Hampton in posting bond for her
in Ada and Elmore County did not make any fact of consequence more or less probable than it
would be without this evidence. First, this evidence was not relevant to Mr. Crumbley’s
identification of Ms. Hampton in the courtroom. Whether Mr. Crumbley’s supervisor could
identify Ms. Hampton did not make it more or less probable that Mr. Crumbley could identify
her. Second, Mr. Crumbley’s identification of Ms. Hampton was not in dispute during the trial.
There was no legitimate basis for the State to offer this evidence for “identification” since
Mr. Crumbley’s ability to identify Ms. Hampton was unchallenged. Third, there was no
challenge to Ms. Hampton’s presence at the relevant events leading up to the alleged crime, the
crime itself, or any relevant events thereafter, including Mr. Crumbley’s tracking her down. In
other words, Ms. Hampton never put her presence at issue, such as through an alibi defense.
Hence, the supervisor’s interactions in posting bond for Ms. Hampton in other counties did not
make it more or less probable that she was present during the commission of the alleged crimes
or her subsequent interactions with Mr. Crumbley. Lastly, even if the supervisor’s interactions
with Ms. Hampton could be relevant for her identification in the courtroom, the nature of those
interactions—posting bond in two other counties—was not relevant for any purpose. The fact
that Mr. Crumbley’s supervisor posted bond for Ms. Hampton in Ada and Elmore County did not
make any material fact of her identification more or less probable, unless the evidence was used
for criminal propensity or character purposes. The district court thus abused its discretion by
admitting this evidence for identification.
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2.

Ms. Hampton’s bonds in other counties, posted by a third party, were not relevant
as prior bad acts to prove identity, and the State provided no notice

Along the same lines, this evidence was not relevant to prove identity pursuant to I.R.E.
404(b). “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” I.R.E. 404(b). “This
evidence of prior misconduct ‘may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident . . . ” State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8 (2013) (quoting I.R.E. 404(b)). Under I.R.E. 404(b),
the evidence must be “relevant as a matter of law to an issue other than the defendant’s character
or propensity.” Ehrlick, 158 Idaho at 913. It must be “relevant to the charged offense.” Id.
(quoting Joy, 155 Idaho at 9).
As an initial matter, Ms. Hampton submits the State failed to provide notice if it intended
to use this evidence under I.R.E. 404(b). The prosecutor must “file and serve reasonable notice
of the general nature of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial” and “do so
reasonably in advance of trial—or during trial if the court, for good cause shown, excuses lack of
pretrial notice.” I.R.E. 404(b)(2). “Compliance with the notice requirement ‘is mandatory and a
condition precedent to admission of other acts evidence,’ State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230
(2008), absent a showing of good cause, I.R.E. 404(b).” State v. Rawlings, 159 Idaho 498, 504
(2015). The State here never provided Ms. Hampton with notice of its intent to offer this
evidence for identity.
Moreover, this evidence was not relevant to prove Ms. Hampton’s identity. Again, her
identification was not at issue. This Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized that
evidence of a prior bad act to prove identity is only admissible if the defendant’s identity as the
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perpetrator was at issue. 2 State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 869 (1983) (“Here without question the
defendant by presenting an alibi defense directly placed his identity as the perpetrator of the
charged offenses in issue.”); State v. Bussard, 114 Idaho 781, 785, 760 P.2d 1197, 1201
(Ct. App. 1988) (“Because the identity of Davis’ alleged confederates in the two charged
burglaries was an issue in this case, a plan embracing all of the burglaries could have been
relevant if, but only if, it tended to prove the identity of those confederates.”). Moreover, even if
Ms. Hampton’s identity was at issue, the supervisor’s actions in posting bond for Ms. Hampton
in other counties simply did not establish her identity for the instant criminal offenses. This
evidence does not aid the jury “in identifying the accused as the person who committed the crime
charged.” 1 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE at § 4:34. The State provided no connection
between these bonds and the instant offenses to identify Ms. Hampton—other than a propensity
to commit crimes or a bad character. This evidence served no purpose except to prejudice the
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Several treatises have recognized a similar rule. See 1 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 4:34
(15th ed.) (“Evidence of other crimes to establish identity is not admissible if the identity of the
accused is not in issue.”); 22B WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5254 (2d ed.)
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (“Judges should only allow prosecutors to use evidence of
other crimes where identity is truly in issue. . . . Prosecutors who want to use other crimes to
prove identity in such cases usually want to evade the general rule excluding evidence of
propensity. Judges should be alert to another specious ploy. The prosecutor can prove that the
witness met the defendant in the past to show how the witness can identify him. But that the
subject of the meeting was to arrange a drug deal adds nothing to its probative worth but does
increase prejudice.”); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (7th ed.) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted) (“Although [identity] is indisputably one of the ultimate purposes for which evidence of
other criminal conduct will be received and frequently is included in the list of permissible
purposes for other-crimes evidence, it is rarely a distinct ground for admission. Almost always,
identity is the inference that flows from one or more of the theories just listed. The second (larger
plan), third (distinctive device), and sixth (motive) seem to be most often relied upon to show
identity. Certainly, the need to prove identity should not be, in itself, a ticket to admission. In
addition, the courts tend to apply stricter standards when the desired inference pertains to identity
as opposed to state of mind.”).

11

jury against Ms. Hampton. The district court abused its discretion by admitting this evidence for
identity.

3.

The State will be unable to show the district court’s abuse of discretion in
admitting irrelevant evidence was harmless

The district court therefore did not apply the correct legal standards when it admitted
irrelevant evidence of Ms. Hampton’s bonds in Ada and Elmore counties. This evidence was not
relevant for Mr. Crumbley’s identification of Ms. Hampton at trial or any point prior, and it was
not relevant to prove Ms. Hampton’s identity pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b). The State will be unable
demonstrate the admission of this irrelevant evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Joy, 155 Idaho at 11. Accordingly, Ms. Hampton respectfully requests this Court vacate her
judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

II
The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. Hampton’s Motion For A Mistrial After The Jury
Heard Improper Testimony On Ms. Hampton’s Warrants In Other Counties And Her
Methamphetamine Purchase
A.

Introduction
Ms. Hampton contends the district court committed reversible error by denying her

motion for a mistrial after the jury heard evidence of her warrants in four other counties and her
purchase of methamphetamine. The inadmissible character evidence prejudiced the jury against
Ms. Hampton and deprived her of a fair trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made.
Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the “abuse
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of discretion” standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is
one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the
incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted
reversible error.
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 68 (2011) (quoting Field, 144 Idaho at 571).
C.

The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. Hampton’s Motion For A Mistrial Because
Testimony On Her Warrants In Other Counties And Methamphetamine Purchase
Prejudiced The Jury Against Her And Deprived Her Of A Fair Trial
I.C.R. 29.1(a) governs a defendant’s motion for a mistrial: “A mistrial may be declared

upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the
proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant
and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” I.C.R. 29.1(a). Ms. Hampton contends the district
court erred by denying her motion because Ms. Hampton could not receive a fair trial with an
unbiased jury once the jury learned of her outstanding warrants in other counties and her
purchase of methamphetamine.
The testimony from Mr. Crumbley and Officer Rivers provided the jury with highly
prejudicial, inadmissible evidence that necessitated a mistrial. First, Mr. Crumbley informed the
jury of multiple warrants in other counties against Ms. Hampton (not to mention his prior
testimony about his supervisor posting bond). Mr. Crumbley explained, after he found
Ms. Hampton at Mr. Herrera’s house, he placed her in custody. (Tr. Vol. I, p.190, L.22–p.192,
L.9.) Once Mr. Crumbley found Ms. Hampton and observed her reaction, the prosecutor asked,
“What happened then?” (Tr. Vol. I, p.190, L.8.) Mr. Crumbley answered, “We walked her out to
our vehicle, and we decided to take her to the Elmore County jail.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.192, Ls.9–11.)
True to form, Mr. Crumbley continued to answer the prosecutor’s question with irrelevant,
prejudicial information: “Talena was out on bond with us, and she had warrants out of Ada,
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Elmore, Jerome, and Twin, so we figured Elmore would be the best central location for
everything to be served on her and to get off her bond there.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.192, Ls.12–16.)
Ms. Hampton moved for a mistrial. (Tr. Vol. I, p.192, Ls.24–25.) Outside the presence of
the jury, Ms. Hampton argued the evidence of her warrants in other counties “are almost
tantamount to saying that there are other convictions in other counties.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.194, Ls.1–
4.) Ms. Hampton acknowledged Mr. Crumbley’s prior testimony about his supervisor’s
knowledge of the other bonds had already been presented to the jury for identification, even
though Ms. Hampton tried to get that evidence excluded. (Tr. Vol. I, p.194, Ls.5–9.)
“Nevertheless,” she argued, “it still has the same prejudicial value.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.194, Ls.10–
11.) And now, she asserted, the jury has learned about warrants in other counties. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.194, Ls.11–14.) Ms. Hampton argued:
And this is one of those cases where there is no real direct evidence. It’s going to
be who the jury believes, between my client and the prosecution’s witnesses, and
that has so prejudiced them at this juncture that there’s no way Talena Hampton
can get a fair shake with the jury.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.194, Ls.16–21.) The prosecution objected and seemed to argue this evidence was
admissible as res gestae (a no longer viable exception to the evidentiary rules). (Tr. Vol. I, p.194,
L.24–p.196, L.7.) Ms. Hampton responded and reiterated the prejudicial effect of outstanding
warrants. (Tr. Vol. I, p.196, L.9–p.197, L.1.) Ms. Hampton also identified her “conundrum” in
having to choose between (1) cross-examining Mr. Crumbley about these warrants (and risk
making “the situation worse” by highlighting these bad facts again for the jury) or (2) not
challenging Mr. Crumbley’s testimony (and having the jury believe Ms. Hampton had at least
four warrants for her arrest). (Tr. Vol. I, p.198, L.11–p.199, L.2.)
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The district court took a brief recess to consider the motion and then denied it. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.199, Ls.13–16.) The district court noted it did not find any cases “regarding mentions of
warrants.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.199, L.17–p.200, L.18.) The district court reasoned:
And I think the issue, as it’s stated by the State, I think, number one, that
needed to be somewhat discussed for identification. I do believe there is some
prejudice. I don’t think it’s unfairly prejudicial at this point.
We haven’t talked about felony convictions. We haven’t talked about what
those matters were. We’re also assuming that we have 13 jurors who haven’t
processed what that even meant, so for those reasons, and because I don’t have
any clear caselaw that tells me this has risen to a level of a 29.1 mistrial, that’s
why I’m going to deny the motion.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.203, Ls.7–18.) The prosecutor informed Mr. Crumbley not to bring up the warrants
again. (Tr. Vol. I, p.204, Ls.5–7.)
Then, from the very next witness, the jury learned even more prejudicial information
about Ms. Hampton. Officer Rivers, who interviewed Ms. Hampton after the alleged offenses,
offered wholly irrelevant testimony about Ms. Hampton’s methamphetamine purchase. (Tr. Vol.
I, p.228, Ls.18–24.) The prosecutor asked Officer Rivers what Ms. Hampton had told him about
“how the circumstances of the robbery came about,” and Officer Rivers answered: “Well, she
mentioned that they had met – when I say they – her, Alexandria [Arellano], and Ivan [Herrara]
– had met at the Chevron, McDonald’s, located at the intersection of Washington and Addison.”
(Tr. Vol. I, p.228, Ls.18–21.) In response to the prosecutor’s follow-up question, “Here in Twin
Falls?” Officer Rivers stated, “Here in Twin Falls. She had purchased some methamphetamine,
and the conversation --.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.228, Ls.22–24.) Ms. Hampton immediately objected.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.228, L.25.) The district court sustained the objection. (Tr. Vol. I, p.229, L.1.)
Ms. Hampton informed the district court to “add that as a basis for my prior motion. I probably
don’t need to go through it again.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.229, Ls.2–4.) The district court stated, “Okay.
Sustain the objection and it is noted with the other motion as well.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.229, Ls.5–7.)
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1.

Ms. Hampton’s outstanding warrants in other counties were irrelevant and
prejudicial evidence of bad character and criminal propensity

First, similar to the issue in Part I, the evidence of Ms. Hampton’s outstanding warrants
was not relevant for any material fact. I.R.E. 401. Mr. Crumbley’s motivations for taking
Ms. Hampton to Elmore County Jail, as opposed to any other jail, did not make it more or less
probable Ms. Hampton committed the alleged offenses. His explanation—“she had warrants out
of Ada, Elmore, Jerome, and Twin, so we figured Elmore would be the best central location for
everything to be served on her and to get off her bond there”—is simply irrelevant. (See Tr. Vol.
I, p.192, Ls.12–16.) Ms. Hampton’s jail location and the reasoning behind Mr. Crumbley’s
decision had no bearing on her guilt or any other issue in the case.
Further, the prosecutor’s suggested purpose for this evidence was in conflict with this
Court’s precedent and the rules of evidence. The prosecutor argued, “[T]here’s a complete story
doctrine here,” and, without this evidence, the jury would wonder why Ms. Hampton was taken
to Elmore and not Twin Falls County. (Tr. Vol. I, p.195, L.4–p.196, L.7.) Ms. Hampton contends
the far more troubling speculation by the jury would be the nature of these outstanding warrants,
not her location between two nearby counties. Setting aside the prejudicial nature of this
evidence, the evidence does not fall under the res gestae doctrine—this Court abrogated that
doctrine about a year before this trial. This Court held “evidence previously considered
admissible as res gestae is only admissible if it meets the criteria established by the Idaho Rules
of Evidence.” State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 574 (2017). Here, the evidence of
Ms. Hampton’s warrants in other counties does not meet I.R.E.’s criteria. This evidence fits
squarely within I.R.E. 404(b)’s prohibition of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove character.
The evidence of Ms. Hampton’s outstanding warrants served only to illustrate her criminal
propensity and bad character by informing the jury that Ms. Hampton apparently traveled all
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over southern Idaho on a crime-spree. Moreover, this evidence was not relevant for
Mr. Crumbley’s identification or Ms. Hampton’s identity for the same reasons as discussed in
Part I. In short, there was no probative value in this evidence. Therefore, Ms. Hampton maintains
this evidence was irrelevant, prejudicial, and thus inadmissible under the I.R.E.

2.

Ms. Hampton’s methamphetamine purchase was irrelevant and prejudicial
evidence of bad character and criminal propensity

The second piece of evidence—Ms. Hampton’s purchase of methamphetamine—was also
irrelevant and overly prejudicial. Again, this evidence falls within I.R.E. 404(b)’s prohibition of
prior bad acts. This evidence of a past crime shows a propensity to commit crimes and a bad
character in selling drugs. The prosecution offered no exception to I.R.E. 404(b) or any other
basis for the relevancy of this evidence. Ms. Hampton argues this evidence was irrelevant,
prejudicial, and thus inadmissible under the I.R.E.

3.

The district court’s refusal to declare a mistrial after the jury learned of this
irrelevant, prejudicial evidence deprived Ms. Hampton of a fair trial

Taken separately or together, Ms. Hampton asserts this evidence necessitated a mistrial.
All of this evidence was irrelevant, prejudicial, and thus inadmissible. The first problematic
evidence of multiple warrants encouraged the jury to find Ms. Hampton guilty of the instant
offenses because she had committed a string of crimes and was “wanted” all over the State.
Indeed, recognizing this evidence’s highly inflammatory nature, Ms. Hampton’s counsel voiced
serious concerns on how to remedy the situation. (Tr. Vol. I, p.198, L.11–p.199, L.2.) Ultimately,
the district court did not instruct the jury to disregard this evidence or provide a limiting
instruction, likely due to the district court’s determination this evidence “needed to be somewhat
discussed for identification.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.203, Ls.8–9.) As such, the jury was free to consider
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this evidence for any purpose. The second problematic evidence of the methamphetamine
purchase simply compounded the error. Although the district court sustained Ms. Hampton’s
objection, (Tr. Vol. I, p.229, Ls.1–6), Ms. Hampton submits the jury could not turn a blind eye to
this evidence once it already learned of multiple outstanding warrants for Ms. Hampton’s arrest.
By this point, the district court should have granted Ms. Hampton’s motion for a mistrial. It
cannot be said that this evidence’s invitation for the jury to find Ms. Hampton guilty based on
her criminal propensity and bad character did not have a continuing impact on the trial.
Ms. Hampton maintains the district court committed reversible error by twice denying her
motion for a mistrial.
Lastly, the State will be unable to show this error was harmless. 3 Ms. Hampton
acknowledges her later admissions to misdemeanor warrants and methamphetamine use, but her
admissions were not “a waiver of the earlier objection.” State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 34
(Ct. App. 1988). “By the time [Ms. Hampton] took the stand, the trial judge had denied the
motion for a mistrial.” Id. Ms. Hampton “sought to defuse the impact of” this evidence. Id.
Therefore, Ms. Hampton submits the district court’s court denial of her motion for a mistrial was
reversible error and not harmless.

3

Ms. Hampton notes another case in which the defendant argued Idaho case law was unclear on
the burden to show harmlessness in the district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial. State v.
Carpentier, No. 45617, 2019 WL 362407 (Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2019) (unpublished). In Carpentier,
the Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that it was undecided whether the
defendant or the State had the burden to prove any error in the denial of the motion was
harmless. 2019 WL 362407, at *3, No. 45617, at p.3. A petition for rehearing on this issue is
currently pending. Petition for Rehearing, State v. Carpentier, No. 45617 (filed Feb. 14, 2019).
Here, whether Ms. Hampton or the State has the burden, the district court’s error in denying her
motion for a mistrial was not harmless.
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III.
The State Did Not Prove Ms. Hampton Aided And Abetted Mr. Herrera In His Assault With A
Gun When The Evidence Showed Nothing More Than Her Mere Knowledge, Acquiescence, Or
Assent In His Crime
A.

Introduction
Ms. Hampton argues the district court erred by denying her I.C.R. 29 motion for a

judgment of acquittal for aiding and abetting aggravated assault. Specifically, she asserts the
State did not prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, Ms. Hampton shared the criminal intent of the
principal, Mr. Herrera. Rather, the evidence showed, at best, Ms. Hampton’s mere knowledge,
assent, or acquiescence in Mr. Herrera’s criminal act of pointing a gun at Mr. White to threaten
him. This was insufficient for the jury to find Ms. Hampton guilty of the charged offense.

B.

Standard Of Review
“This Court will not overturn a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury
verdict, where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,
285 (2003). “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it
and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven.”
State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 546 (2015). A conviction can be based primarily
upon circumstantial evidence, State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 50–51 (1969), and
“even when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently with a
finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it also
gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt,” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712
(2009).

State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 782, 790 (2017). The Court does not substitute its “judgment for that of
the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence.” State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 546 (2015) (quoting State v.
Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460 (2012)). The Court views “the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution.” Id. (quoting Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 460).
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C.

The State Did Not Meet Its Burden To Prove Ms. Hampton Had More Than Mere
Knowledge, Assent, Or Acquiescence In Mr. Herrera’s Assault With A Gun
Ms. Hampton argues the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s

guilty verdict for aiding and abetting aggravated assault. The State has the burden to prove all
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the
right to due process, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that as a part of that
due process, “no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction
except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of
fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.”
Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 5 (quoting State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 5 (2014)). “[E]ven when it can be
said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” “a properly
instructed jury may occasionally convict.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979).
Appellate review of sufficiency is limited in scope, however. Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 545. The
inquiry is not whether this Court would find the defendant guilty, but whether any rational jury
could have found the State met its burden to prove each essential element with substantial
evidence. Id. at 546. Ms. Hampton contends the State did not meet its burden here.

1.

To prove Ms. Hampton guilty of aiding and abetting aggravated assault, the State
had to show she not only shared Mr. Herrera’s intent to threaten with a gun, but
also knowingly acted in some manner to bring that result

Under Idaho law, a person commits an assault by either:
(a) An unlawful attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to commit a violent injury
on the person of another; or
(b) An intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of
another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which
creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent.
I.C. § 18-901. An assault is elevated to “aggravated assault” if the person commits the offense
“[w]ith a deadly weapon or instrument without intent to kill.” I.C. § 18-905(a).
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Here, the State charged Ms. Hampton with aggravated assault under I.C. § 18-901(b): an
intentional and unlawful threat, with apparent ability, to commit a violence upon Mr. White with
a gun. (R., p.48.) The State, however, did not charge Ms. Hampton as the principal. Rather,
Ms. Hampton aided and abetted another (Mr. Herrera) to commit the assault. (R., p.48.) As such,
the district court instructed the jury, to find Ms. Hampton guilty, the State must prove
Ms. Hampton aided and abetted Mr. Herrera who committed an assault upon Mr. White “by
pointing a gun” at him. (R., p.120.)
Aiders and abettors are culpable as principals. State v. Horejs, 143 Idaho 260, 263, 141
P.3d 1129, 1132 (Ct. App. 2006). Idaho “has abolished the distinction between principals and
aiders and abettors . . . .” State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 973 (2008). Idaho Code 19-1430
provides:
The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal and between
principals in the first and second degree, in cases of felony, is abrogated; and all
persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether they directly commit
the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, though not
present, shall hereafter be prosecuted, tried, and punished as principals, and no
other facts need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are
required in an indictment against his principal.
I.C. § 19-1430. Similarly, I.C. § 18-204 states:
All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or
misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or
aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and
encouraged its commission . . . are principals in any crime so committed.
I.C. § 18-204. “Together,” these statutes “show a legislative intent to consider defendants as
principals whether they directly committed the crime or aided and abetted in the commission of
the crime.” Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974.
Because aider or abettors and principals are viewed as equally culpable, “‘aiding and
abetting’” requires some proof that the accused either participated in or assisted, encouraged,
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solicited, or counseled the crime.” State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 347 (1990) (citations
omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657 (2000). “A person
who aids and abets the commission of a crime must ‘knowingly participate[ ] by any of such
means in bringing about the commission of a crime.’” Smith, 161 Idaho at 787 (quoting
Howard v. Felton, 85 Idaho 286, 297 (1963)). Consequently, “[m]ere knowledge of a crime and
assent to or acquiescence in its commission does not give rise to accomplice liability.” Randles,
117 Idaho at 347. Along with the criminal act, “[a]iding and abetting contemplates a sharing by
the aider and abettor of the criminal intent of the perpetrator. Thus, the aider and abettor must
have the requisite intent and have acted in some manner to bring about the intended result.”
State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted). In other words, “[t]he
mental state required is generally the same as that required for the underlying offense—the aider
and abettor must share the criminal intent of the principal and there must be a community of
purpose in the unlawful undertaking.” State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 204 (Ct. App.
2003) (citing State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 386 (1985)).

2.

The State did not prove Ms. Hampton shared Mr. Herrera’s intent or acted to
bring upon the assault with a gun because no evidence showed she participated,
encouraged, aided, or facilitated the crime

In this case, the State failed to show Ms. Hampton shared Mr. Herrera’s criminal intent to
intentionally and unlawfully threaten Mr. White with a gun. The evidence adduced at trial
showed, at best, Ms. Hampton had knowledge Mr. Herrera had a gun before the conspiracy and
commission of grand theft. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.231, L.19–p.232, L.7, p.246, Ls.6–11.) Yet, there
were no allegations of a conspiracy to commit assault. No evidence showed Ms. Hampton
conspired with Mr. Herrera to threaten Mr. White with a gun before or after the theft
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Moreover, the evidence did not show Ms. Hampton knew Mr. Herrera was going to use
that gun to commit the subsequent assault upon Mr. White. The State must prove Ms. Hampton
shared Mr. Herrera’s “intent to make a threat” with the gun, and the State cannot do so based on
the evidence. State v. Larson, 158 Idaho 130, 136 (Ct. App. 2014) (discussing I.C. § 18-901(b)).
To the contrary, the evidence showed Ms. Hampton told Mr. Herrera not to use the gun in their
alleged bail bondsman scheme or otherwise. Officer Rivers and Officer Paredez, as well as
Ms. Hampton, all testified she told him not to bring or use a gun. (Tr. Vol. I, p.231, L.19–p.232,
L.7, p.246, Ls.6–11; Tr. Vol. II, p.316, Ls.6–21, p.316, L.25–p.317, L.1.) Rather than assisting or
encouraging Mr. Herrera to commit an assault, Ms. Hampton did the opposite. She strongly
advised him against using a gun. As such, Ms. Hampton did not share Mr. Herrera’s intent to
threaten Mr. White by pointing a gun at him. (R., pp.48, 120.) And no evidence showed
Ms. Hampton engaged in any conduct to bring about Mr. Herrera pointing a gun at Mr. White,
such as encouraging, assisting, or soliciting Mr. Herrera to bring or use a gun.
Based on the evidence, the State has not shown Ms. Hampton acted in any way to bring
upon Mr. Herrera’s actions in assaulting Mr. White with a gun. The jury may have inferred
Ms. Hampton had some knowledge of Mr. Herrera’s intended crime (despite her attempts to
discourage him) or had assented to or acquiesced in its commission in the TARC alley, but that
was insufficient for Ms. Hampton to be found guilty of aggravate assault. Randles, 117 Idaho at
347. Even construing the evidence in the light most favorable the State, the evidence was
insufficient to prove Ms. Hampton aided and abetted Mr. Herrera to commit an assault upon
Mr. White by threatening harm with a gun. The district court therefore erred by denying
Ms. Hampton’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on this charge.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Hampton respectfully requests this Court vacate her judgment of conviction and
remand her case for a new trial in light of the evidentiary errors and denial of her mistrial
motion. She also respectfully requests this Court vacate her judgment of conviction for
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and remand this case with instructions for the district
court to enter a judgment of acquittal.
DATED this 21st day of February, 2019.
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